OpenAI prohibits using its tools to meaningfully assist anyone attempting to develop biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological weapons capable of causing mass casualties, regardless of the stated purpose.
This analysis describes what OpenAI's agreement states, permits, or reserves. It does not constitute a legal determination about enforceability. Regulatory applicability and practical outcomes may vary by jurisdiction, enforcement context, and individual circumstances. Read our methodology
This provision addresses one of the highest-risk potential misuses of generative AI, and its scope covers not just direct weapons synthesis but any assistance that provides 'serious uplift' — a term that implies a meaningful capability increase — to someone pursuing such weapons.
Interpretive note: The term 'serious uplift' is not defined with precision in the document, creating interpretive ambiguity about where the line falls between prohibited assistance and permissible educational or research discussion.
Users and operators may not use OpenAI products to provide meaningful technical assistance in developing weapons of mass destruction; the term 'serious uplift' indicates the prohibition covers substantive capability assistance, not merely discussing these topics in educational or historical contexts, though the precise boundary of this distinction is not fully defined in the document.
How other platforms handle this
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You may not use the Services to attempt to circumvent, disable, or otherwise interfere with safety-related features of the Services, including features that prevent or restrict the generation of certain types of content.
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"Provide serious uplift to those seeking to create biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological weapons with the potential for mass casualties— Excerpt from OpenAI's OpenAI Usage Policies
(1) REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: This provision engages with US export control law (Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, and equivalent international treaties and national statutes. The Department of Justice, Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, and State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls have relevant enforcement authority. The EU AI Act classifies AI systems posing unacceptable risk in national security contexts as prohibited. (2) GOVERNANCE EXPOSURE: High. The 'serious uplift' standard requires interpretive judgment about what constitutes meaningful capability enhancement versus general scientific information, creating potential compliance ambiguity for operators in research, defense, academic, and dual-use technology sectors. (3) JURISDICTION FLAGS: US export control laws apply extraterritorially and may affect non-US operators using OpenAI services to conduct dual-use research. EU operators should assess this provision under the EU AI Act's prohibited use categories. Academic and research institutions in particular should evaluate whether their use cases approach the 'serious uplift' threshold. (4) CONTRACT AND VENDOR IMPLICATIONS: Defense contractors, academic research institutions, and life sciences companies deploying OpenAI via API should conduct specific legal review of whether their intended use cases could be characterized as providing 'serious uplift' under this provision, and document that review in their vendor risk assessments. (5) COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS: Operators in dual-use research sectors should establish internal review protocols for AI-assisted research outputs, consult with export control counsel regarding their specific use cases, and consider whether their terms of service with end users adequately address this restriction.
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This provision addresses one of the highest-risk potential misuses of generative AI, and its scope covers not just direct weapons synthesis but any assistance that provides 'serious uplift' — a term that implies a meaningful capability increase — to someone pursuing such weapons.
Users and operators may not use OpenAI products to provide meaningful technical assistance in developing weapons of mass destruction; the term 'serious uplift' indicates the prohibition covers substantive capability assistance, not merely discussing these topics in educational or historical contexts, though the precise boundary of this distinction is not fully defined in the document.
ConductAtlas has identified this type of provision across 1 platforms. See the full comparison.
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