OpenAI prohibits using its models to generate cyberweapons, malware, or other malicious code that could cause significant damage, distinguishing this from permissible cybersecurity research and defensive security work.
This analysis describes what OpenAI's agreement states, permits, or reserves. It does not constitute a legal determination about enforceability. Regulatory applicability and practical outcomes may vary by jurisdiction, enforcement context, and individual circumstances. Read our methodology
This provision applies to all users and operators and covers generation of offensive cyber tools, though the document implicitly acknowledges a distinction between prohibited offensive tool creation and permitted defensive security research — a distinction that may not always be clear in practice.
Interpretive note: The distinction between prohibited cyberweapon creation and permitted security research is acknowledged implicitly in the policy but the precise boundary is not fully defined within this provision.
Users conducting legitimate cybersecurity research, penetration testing, or security education may operate near the boundary of this prohibition; the policy does not specify in this provision exactly how defensive or research-oriented security work is distinguished from prohibited cyberweapon creation, though other policy sections address permitted security research contexts.
How other platforms handle this
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You may not use the Services to attempt to circumvent, disable, or otherwise interfere with safety-related features of the Services, including features that prevent or restrict the generation of certain types of content.
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"Create cyberweapons or malicious code that could cause significant damage if deployed— Excerpt from OpenAI's OpenAI Usage Policies
(1) REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: This provision engages with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in the US, the UK Computer Misuse Act, EU Directive on attacks against information systems, and equivalent national computer crime statutes. The FTC has consumer protection authority over AI platforms that fail to prevent generation of tools used in consumer-facing cyberattacks. CISA has broader critical infrastructure protection authority that intersects with cyberweapon proliferation risks. (2) GOVERNANCE EXPOSURE: Medium to High. Cybersecurity firms, academic researchers, and penetration testing operators using OpenAI's API need clear internal guidance on how to document that their use cases fall within permissible security research rather than cyberweapon generation. The policy's 'significant damage' threshold introduces a severity qualifier that requires judgment. (3) JURISDICTION FLAGS: Computer crime laws vary in their treatment of dual-use security tools across jurisdictions. EU operators should note that the EU AI Act's high-risk classification may apply to AI systems used in critical infrastructure cybersecurity contexts. UK operators face Computer Misuse Act exposure for unlawful creation of attack tools. (4) CONTRACT AND VENDOR IMPLICATIONS: Security product vendors, managed security service providers, and penetration testing firms deploying OpenAI via API should document their use case classifications, establish internal review processes for AI-assisted security tool development, and ensure client contracts address appropriate use boundaries. (5) COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS: Operators in the security sector should establish written policies distinguishing their use of OpenAI for defensive research versus tool generation, consult legal counsel on jurisdiction-specific computer crime law applicability, and implement access controls limiting AI-assisted security tool development to credentialed personnel.
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This provision applies to all users and operators and covers generation of offensive cyber tools, though the document implicitly acknowledges a distinction between prohibited offensive tool creation and permitted defensive security research — a distinction that may not always be clear in practice.
Users conducting legitimate cybersecurity research, penetration testing, or security education may operate near the boundary of this prohibition; the policy does not specify in this provision exactly how defensive or research-oriented security work is distinguished from prohibited cyberweapon creation, though other policy sections address permitted security research contexts.
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