71 Total

Key Facts · in the document’s own words

What measures can Anthropic take in circumstances it deems appropriate?
“we mean the former and not the latter. We now clarify that, even if not required by the RSP, we remain free to take measures such as pausing the development of our AI systems in any circumstances in which we deem them appropriate.”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic retains the freedom to take measures such as pausing AI system development in any circumstances it deems appropriate, even if not required by the RSP.
What are ASL-3 deployment safeguards designed to prevent?
“These safeguards are being designed to prevent misuse of capabilities that could enable severe harm, particularly in relation to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) technologies.”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic is designing ASL-3 deployment safeguards to prevent misuse of capabilities that could enable severe harm, particularly in relation to CBRN technologies.
What policy does Anthropic maintain?
“RSP Noncompliance Reporting and Anti-Retaliation Policy”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic maintains an RSP Noncompliance Reporting and Anti-Retaliation Policy.
What does Anthropic revise its threshold for?
“revises our threshold for automated R&D to better track the threat model of concern”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic revises its threshold for automated R&D to better track the threat model of concern.
What new capability threshold did Anthropic add related to CBRN development?
“added a new capability threshold related to CBRN development, which defines capabilities that could substantially uplift the development capabilities of moderately resourced state programs”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic added a new capability threshold related to CBRN development, defining capabilities that could substantially uplift the development capabilities of moderately resourced state programs.
What does Anthropic revise its threshold for to better track the threat model of concern?
“revises our threshold for novel chemical/biological weapons production to better track the threat model of concern”
Version CA-V-004730, captured July 11, 2026 · live source ↗
Our reading, not the document’s words
Anthropic revises its threshold for novel chemical/biological weapons production to better track the threat model of concern.
Summary
Generated by a model from the captured document; not read by a person

This document is Anthropic's internal policy for deciding when its AI systems are safe enough to keep developing and deploying. It sets specific capability thresholds that trigger safety requirements — including around weapons of mass destruction — and requires Anthropic to document and review risks at each stage. Anthropic also retains the right to pause AI development at any point it judges necessary, even when the policy does not formally require it.

Analysis

The Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy (RSP) establishes a structured framework of capability thresholds, safeguard requirements, and internal governance obligations that govern how Anthropic develops and deploys its AI systems. The policy defines specific capability thresholds — including for automated R&D, novel chemical and biological weapons production, and CBRN state-program uplift — at which mandatory safeguard and disclosure obligations activate. It imposes affirmative documentation requirements, including Risk Reports quantifying risk across all deployed models and, at the AI R&D-4 threshold, a formal misalignment risk case. Internal governance mechanisms include multi-party authorization for production code access to model weights, a minimum internal disclosure audience of 200 employees for risk reports, LTBT authority over external review of Risk Reports, and a named Noncompliance Reporting and Anti-Retaliation Policy. Anthropic retains authority to pause AI system development in any circumstances it deems appropriate, independent of RSP-mandated thresholds.

What this means for you

As an internal governance document, this policy does not create direct rights or obligations for individual users. It establishes Anthropic's own obligations: to assess and document AI risks across all deployed models, to implement structural safeguards against misuse of dangerous capabilities (particularly CBRN-related), and to subject its risk assessments to both internal disclosure and external review. The existence of a named Noncompliance Reporting and Anti-Retaliation Policy means there is a formal internal channel for reporting RSP violations. Individual users have no direct action specified in this document.

Institutional Analysis
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Featured provisions
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Complete Provision Index

Every distinct legal provision identified in this document. Featured provisions appear above with analysis.

71 provisions
12 featured
15 clause types

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Archival ProvenanceSource & Archival Record
This version captured July 11, 2026 13:43 UTC
Last successful capture July 11, 2026 13:43 UTC
Date stated by the document July 8, 2026 (as printed in this version)
Capture Method Automated scheduled archival capture
Document ID CA-D-000823
Version ID CA-V-004730
SHA-256 (extracted text, extractor v5) 1b14eedee19c702da6ea925897fe665a32727908a1ad8b5e4abc682d8b5bf33d
✓ Snapshot stored Archived-bytes anchor not yet recorded

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