Claude cannot be used to help create, design, or acquire weapons of mass destruction including biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons, or any modifications to evade detection.
This analysis describes what Anthropic's agreement states, permits, or reserves. It does not constitute a legal determination about enforceability. Regulatory applicability and practical outcomes may vary by jurisdiction, enforcement context, and individual circumstances. Read our methodology
This is one of the absolute prohibitions in the policy, covering not just direct weapon design but also precursor development, weaponization processes, and evasion modifications, making the scope of the prohibition comprehensive.
Defense contractors and federal agencies using Claude must find alternatives. Enterprise customers with defense-adjacent business face compliance risk.
This provision means Claude is hard-blocked from assisting with any aspect of weapons of mass destruction development. For the vast majority of users, this has no practical impact, but it is a categorical prohibition that cannot be unlocked through any operator permission.
How other platforms handle this
You may not use Runway's tools to create content that promotes, glorifies, or facilitates acts of terrorism, mass violence, or genocide, or that could be used to provide material support to individuals or organizations engaged in such activities.
Customer will not, and will not permit any other person (including any End User) to: ... (d) attempt to reverse engineer, decompile, or otherwise attempt to discover the source code or underlying components (e.g., algorithms, weights, or systems) of the Mistral AI Products, including using the Outpu...
You may not use the Services to attempt to circumvent, disable, or otherwise interfere with safety-related features of the Services, including features that prevent or restrict the generation of certain types of content.
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"Synthesize, or otherwise develop, high-yield explosives or biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons or their precursors, including modifications to evade detection or medical countermeasures [...] Produce, modify, design, or illegally acquire weapons, explosives, dangerous materials or other systems designed to cause harm to or loss of human life.— Excerpt from Anthropic's Anthropic API Usage Policy
(1) REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: This provision engages the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, Chemical Weapons Convention implementation statute, Nuclear Non-Proliferation frameworks, and export control regulations including the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of Commerce have overlapping enforcement authority. Internationally, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obligations apply. (2) GOVERNANCE EXPOSURE: High reputational and legal risk if violations occur; low operational compliance burden for standard users. The inclusion of 'precursors' and 'modifications to evade detection or medical countermeasures' reflects awareness of dual-use research risks. For research institutions and biosecurity organizations, the policy's application to legitimate defensive research may require specific guidance from Anthropic. (3) JURISDICTION FLAGS: Export control implications apply globally. US persons and entities have specific obligations under EAR and ITAR regardless of where they are located. Academic and research institutions may face tension between this prohibition and legitimate biosecurity research, which is jurisdiction-dependent in its legal treatment. (4) CONTRACTUAL AND VENDOR IMPLICATIONS: Research institutions, defense contractors, and biosecurity organizations using Claude must evaluate whether their intended use cases fall within the prohibition or legitimate research exceptions. The governmental carve-out may be relevant for certain defense or public health research applications, but the CBRN weapons prohibition appears to be among the absolute limits not subject to modification. (5) COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS: Organizations in dual-use research fields should obtain specific written guidance from Anthropic on permitted biosecurity research use cases before deployment. Legal teams should assess whether existing export control compliance programs extend to AI tool usage in relevant research contexts.
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This is one of the absolute prohibitions in the policy, covering not just direct weapon design but also precursor development, weaponization processes, and evasion modifications, making the scope of the prohibition comprehensive.
This provision means Claude is hard-blocked from assisting with any aspect of weapons of mass destruction development. For the vast majority of users, this has no practical impact, but it is a categorical prohibition that cannot be unlocked through any operator permission.
ConductAtlas has identified this type of provision across 1 platforms. See the full comparison.
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