This analysis describes what Substack's agreement states, permits, or reserves. It does not constitute a legal determination about enforceability. Regulatory applicability and practical outcomes may vary by jurisdiction, enforcement context, and individual circumstances. Read our methodology
The disclosure informs users that direct message content is not protected by end-to-end encryption, meaning it may be accessible to parties other than the sender and recipient.
Substack now discloses that it shares account identifiers, such as email addresses and usernames, with trusted industry child safety organizations to detect and prevent online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The policy also establishes that Substack will respond to privacy rights requests within one month, or up to three months for complex requests, providing more certainty about response timelines. Additionally, the policy clarifies that direct message recipients may retain messages even if you request deletion or delete your account, which is now explicitly stated rather than implied.
View change record →The updated policy no longer commits to responding to privacy rights requests within one month or within three months for complex requests. This removes a procedural timeline that previously bound Substack's response obligations. Additionally, the explicit disclosure that Substack shares account identifiers with child safety consortia to detect online child sexual exploitation has been removed from the policy, though the practice itself is not stated to have ended. The direct message retention language is now framed more directly: recipients may retain messages even if you request deletion or close your account.
View change record →Users who send direct messages on Substack should be aware that those messages are not end-to-end encrypted and do not carry the protections of a dedicated secure messaging service.
How other platforms handle this
Consistent with applicable law, you understand and agree that Tinder may not share information with you regarding your account termination if doing so would potentially impair the safety or privacy of other users.
within the Services, all discussion boards, groups, or other public forums available to participants are publicly visible to other participants.
We will make it clear by notice to you which (if any) goods or services, or website links, we receive a benefit from by featuring them on our Platform.
"direct messages are not end-to-end encrypted, and are not a substitute for secure messaging services.Excerpt from Substack's Privacy Policy
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The disclosure informs users that direct message content is not protected by end-to-end encryption, meaning it may be accessible to parties other than the sender and recipient.
Users who send direct messages on Substack should be aware that those messages are not end-to-end encrypted and do not carry the protections of a dedicated secure messaging service.
ConductAtlas has identified this type of provision across 272 platforms. See the full comparison.
No. ConductAtlas is an independent monitoring service. We are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Substack.