Captured before automated identity checks (Oct 14, 2026): accurate as of its capture on Aug 14, 2026; our capture on Oct 21, 2026 found the same text, but its identity was not checked by them.
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Companies change their terms without announcing it. We capture governance documents, compare each new version with the last, and publish what changed, with the source text behind it. One email a week on what we found and what we could not reach.
This page describes what the document states, permits, or reserves. It does not constitute a legal determination about enforceability. Regulatory applicability may vary by jurisdiction. Methodology
“Anonymous request routing helps ensure non-targetability.”
“We designed the PCC application protocol to preserve client anonymity and efficiently route traffic through the PCC fleet.”
“It must be possible to constrain and analyze all the components that critically contribute to the guarantees of the overall PCC system.”
“The PCC inference engine enables high performance while keeping user data private.”
“PCC must not contain privileged interfaces that might enable Apple site reliability staff to bypass PCC privacy guarantees.”
“An attacker should not be able to attempt to compromise personal data that belongs to specific, targeted PCC users without attempting a broad compromise of the entire PCC system.”
This document describes how Apple Intelligence protects your data when it processes your requests on Apple's servers. Your data is used only to answer your specific request and is not kept afterward. The system is built so that neither outside attackers nor Apple's own staff have a technical path to single out or retrieve your personal data.
This document establishes the security and privacy architecture of Apple Private Cloud Compute (PCC), Apple Intelligence's server-side processing system. It mandates that user data be used exclusively for fulfilling the user's specific request and must not be retained once processing is complete. The architecture is structurally designed without privileged interfaces that could expose user data or allow even Apple's own site reliability staff to bypass privacy guarantees. Non-targetability is enforced as a system-level property: an attacker cannot access a specific user's personal data without attempting a broad compromise of the entire PCC system. External verifiability is built in as a requirement, mandating that security researchers must be able to confirm, with a high degree of confidence, that PCC's privacy and security guarantees match Apple's public commitments.
When you use Apple Intelligence features that rely on server-side processing, your personal data is used only to fulfill your specific request and is not retained after that request is complete. The system is architecturally designed so that no one — including Apple staff — has a privileged interface to access your data, and an attacker cannot target your data individually without attempting to compromise the entire system. A cryptographic method is used to retrieve relevant server-side records without disclosing which records you accessed, preserving your privacy even beyond the core processing boundary. No specific user opt-out or preference action is established by these provisions.
Which mapped governance frameworks each document engages, tied to the specific provisions that engage them.
We withheld clauses we had published from this document. Each withholding is recorded in our correction log:
“Anonymous request routing helps ensure non-targetability.”
“We designed the PCC application protocol to preserve client anonymity and efficiently route traffic through the PCC fleet.”
“It must be possible to constrain and analyze all the components that critically contribute to the guarantees of the overall PCC system.”
“The PCC inference engine enables high performance while keeping user data private.”
“An attacker should not be able to attempt to compromise personal data that belongs to specific, targeted PCC users without attempting a broad compromise of the entire PCC system.”
“PCC must not contain privileged interfaces that might enable Apple site reliability staff to bypass PCC privacy guarantees.”
“PCC is designed without privileged interfaces that might expose user data.”
“The PCC node is designed to safeguard user data and enforce that it is not retained once request processing is complete.”
“A cryptographic technique for retrieving data from servers outside the PCC trust boundary without revealing which records were accessed.”
“PCC must use the personal user data that it receives exclusively for the purpose of fulfilling the user's request. User data must not be accessible after the response is returned to the user.”
“Security researchers need to be able to verify, with a high degree of confidence, that our privacy and security guarantees for PCC match our public promises.”
“PCC nodes support privacy-aware management, observation, and debug capabilities.”
Every distinct legal provision identified in this document. Featured provisions appear above with analysis.
We have not recorded a change to this document since we began capturing it. Monitor includes alerts from a daily check, structured change summaries, and monitoring for up to 20 platforms.
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